Disarmament and International Security Committee (DISEC) - Topics

1. The Outer Space Treaty and Ballistic Missile Defense: Time for a Review
2. The Privatisation of War. Private Military and Security Companies

Topic A
The Outer Space Treaty and Ballistic Missile Defense: Time for a Review

Since the beginning of manned orbital flights, many military and peaceful developments of the use of outer space have led to a need for legal regulation. The first major step was the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Bodies (hereafter “1967 Outer Space Treaty”), commended by the United Nations General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI) of 19 December 1966 and entered into force on 10 October 1967. The 1967 Outer Space Treaty forms a general legal basis for the peaceful use of outer space and provides a framework for further developing the law of outer space. So far 98 states have ratified, and an additional 27 states have signed the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.

Still, there is a general concern that all the current treaties related to outer space do not adequately cover the present challenges posed by space-based weapons and ballistic missile defense (BMD).

Although some of the current treaties do prohibit or restrict the deployment of such weapons, the provisions are limited in scope and coverage. Moreover, none of the existing legal instruments unequivocally prevents the testing, deployment and use of weapons other than nuclear, chemical and biological, in outer space. Nor does any relevant legal instrument cover the use of force or threat of use of force against a country's assets in outer space. The placement of nuclear weapons in space is prohibited under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, but nuclear-warheads on BMD interceptors launched from the ground into space are not prohibited.

Potential threat of a high altitude nuclear detonation could have devastating consequences not only on ground-level, but also in space, disrupting seriously the civil infrastructure used in space for important security and development purposes such as meteorology, environmental monitoring and disaster prevention, communications, education, entertainment and treaty verification.

A few countries in the world today are already involved in a BMD. The most prominent example is the United States, setting up a U.S. Missile Defense System, of which parts will be positioned on European Union soil (Poland and Czech Republic), and therefore provoking tensions and threatening to cause great damage to the relations between the U.S. and the Russian Federation. Although the installation of these parts is a national, sovereign decision of the countries involved, taking into account the role for the European Security and Defense Policy to play in this matter, the potential threat to the world’s security makes it an important issue.

The answers to the following questions should lead us to strengthen the existing legal framework in order to encompass new threats and to prevent possible disastrous effects of the continuing militarization of outer space:

• Is there a need for a common policy on BMD? Or is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty sufficient?
• Is your country involved in a BMD project?
• What is your country’s position on a possible policy / regulation?
• Which is the most appropriate platform to implement a common policy into a legal instrument?

An outer space with or without BMD and BMD with or without nuclear warheads? A controversial question to which you, the ZagiMUN DISEC, should find an answer!

Topic B
The Privatisation of War. Private Military and Security Companies

The downsizing of armed forces in many countries in the aftermath of the Cold War and the development of many new conflicts, which increased the demand for military manpower and expertise, favoured the emergence and rapid growth of private military companies (PMCs) and private security companies (PSCs) in the 1990s. This evolution changed the international order, which until the second half of the 20th century was characterized by a Westphalian world of the nation-state monopolizing the application of force.

PMCs are private companies that specialize in military skills, including combat operations, strategic planning, intelligence collection, operational support, logistics, training, procurement and maintenance of arms and equipment. PSCs are companies that specialize in providing security and protection of personnel and property, including humanitarian and industrial assets. Most PMCs and PSCs serve governments and armed forces, work for dictators, regimes of failing states, organized crime, drug cartels and terrorist-linked groups, but also for the UN, NGOs and even environmental groups.

Private contractors are now thought of as necessary for intervention, peacekeeping, and occupation. The US, UK, Canada and many other states would struggle to wage war without such private companies. A good example is the current war in Iraq.

The debate in our committee should be focussed on following key problems:

1. A legal framework / status of PMCs and PSCs
   

   The International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries of 1989 is only applicable to controlling the activities of mercenaries. The failure to establish the exact legal status of PMCs and PSCs under international law effectively defers the problems to the national level. To date, action to control PMCs and PSCs has been ad hoc and sporadic. While most countries recognize the need to prohibit the activities of mercenaries, few have developed laws to support the international agreements that exist. The absence of regulation in the private provision of military and security services, the difficulty in democratic control, as well as the inadequacy of measures to hold the companies and their employees to account for their actions, are of particular concern. The most important consequence of this ambiguous legal status is the accountability of PMCs and PSCs. PMCs and PSCs are not accountable to the people and parliament, nor are employees of private contractors subject to the military code of justice. They are not truly subject to governmental control, partly because they are not beholden to government, and because they do not confine their activities within the borders of any single state.

2. PMCs, PSCs and the proliferation of small arms
   

   The opening up of the international arms trade, globalisation, the integration of the global market and highly mobile and accessible communication equipment are important factors, which have facilitated the emergence of PMCs and PSCs. Arms procurement and brokering of small arms and lights weapons (SALW) are integral aspects of the activities of PMCs and PSCs. Such companies play an important role in the spread and misuse of small arms when they perform arms brokering and transportation services. Additionally, in most cases the operation of PMCs and PSCs is in violation of UN or other regional arms embargoes. Most arms embargoes do not cover military services. Finally, such companies can present a risk by contributing to the militarisation of society and the exacerbation of tensions in a region.

Currently, the UN has done little to tackle these two issues. Time for the ZagiMUN DISEC to take over and to come up with realistic solutions for this exciting topic!